

Bounds for single-resource allocations via LP ①

- We want to use LPs to get bounds for the revenue under single-resource allocation

Setting

C units, n classes $(D_n, P_n), (D_{n-1}, P_{n-1}), \dots, (D_1, P_1)$

- Idea - Suppose the demands arrive simultaneously

$$\begin{aligned} V_n^{UB}(c) &\equiv \max_x \sum_{i=1}^n P_i x_i \\ &\text{(given } D_n, D_{n-1}, \dots, D_1) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \leq c \\ &\quad x_i \leq D_i \quad \forall i \\ &\quad x_i \geq 0 \quad \forall i \end{aligned}$$

The solution to this is given by a simple greedy policy

$$V_n^{UB}(c) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^n P_k \cdot \min \left\{ D_k, c - \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} D_i \right\} \right]$$

we can take expectation over $\{D_1, D_2, \dots, D_n\}$

In words - allocate to all class 1 customers, then to class 2, and so on till seats are exhausted.


Now we try and simplify this

$$V_n^{UB}(c) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^n P_k \cdot \min \left\{ D_k, c - \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} D_i \right\} \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[P_1 \cdot \min \{ D_1, c \} + P_2 \cdot \min \{ D_2, c - D_1 \} + \dots + P_n \cdot \min \left\{ D_n, c - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} D_i \right\} \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^n (P_k - P_{k+1}) \mathbb{E} \left[\min \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^k D_i, c \right\} \right] \right]$$

we define $P_{n+1} = 0$



The last equality follows from the diagram - essentially, it counts the revenue in two ways!

By linearity of expectation (we can always use that!!!)

$$V_n^{UB}(c) = \sum_{k=1}^n (P_k - P_{k+1}) \mathbb{E} \left[\min \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^k D_i, c \right\} \right]$$

By Jensen's: $\mathbb{E}[\min(\cdot)] \leq \min(\mathbb{E}[\cdot])$

$$\leq \sum_{k=1}^n (P_k - P_{k+1}) \cdot \min \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i, c \right\}$$

$\mu_i = \mathbb{E}[D_i]$

So now we have 2 upper bounds

(3)

LP bound - $V_n^{LP}(c) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{k=1}^n P_k \cdot \min \left\{ D_k, c - \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} D_i \right\} \right]$

'Fluid' bound - $V_n^{Fl}(c) = \sum_{k=1}^n (P_k - P_{k+1}) \cdot \min \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i, c \right\}$

Let $V_n(c)$ denote the actual value function. Then

$$V_n(c) \leq V_n^{LP}(c) \leq V_n^{Fl}(c)$$

From fluid LP to bid-prices

- Whenever you see an LP, always ask what the dual can tell us! Let's try this for the fluid LP

$$V_n^{Fl}(c) \equiv \max \sum_{k=1}^n P_k x_k$$

s.t. $x_k \leq \mu_k \quad \forall k \quad : y_k$

$$\sum_{k=1}^n x_k \leq c \quad : z$$

$$x_k \geq 0$$

$$V_n^{dual}(c) \equiv \min \sum_{k=1}^n \mu_k y_k + c z$$

s.t. $y_k + z \geq P_k \quad \forall k$


$$y_k \geq 0, z \geq 0$$

- Soln to dual: $y_k = (P_k - z)^+$, $V_n^{dual}(c) = \min_{z \geq 0} \left[\sum_{k=1}^n \mu_k (P_k - z)^+ + c z \right]$

$$\Rightarrow z(c) = \arg \min_{z \geq 0} \underbrace{\left[\sum_{k=1}^n \mu_k (P_k - z)^+ + c z \right]}_{\text{convex!}}$$

Continuing from above

$$z(c) = \underset{z \geq 0}{\operatorname{argmin}} \left[\sum_{k=1}^n \mu_k (P_k - z)^+ + c \cdot z \right]$$



For any $\mu_k, c \geq 0$

$\sum_{k=1}^n \mu_k (P_k - z)^+ + c \cdot z$ is convex

$$\text{Let } z^* = \operatorname{argmin} \left[\sum_{k=1}^n \mu_k (P_k - z)^+ + c \cdot z \right]$$

$$\Rightarrow z(c) = \max \{ z^*, 0 \}$$

$$y_k = (P_k - z(c))^+$$

We can simplify this to get $z(c) = 0$ if $c > \sum_{k=1}^n \mu_k$
 else $z(c) = \min \{ P_j \mid c \leq \sum_{k=1}^j \mu_k \}$

This gives us a bid-price heuristic policy

- If $c \leq \sum_{k=1}^j \mu_k$: accept all customers bid-price
- Else, accept fare classes $A(c) = \{ j \mid P_j > z(c) \}$
i.e. $j \mid c \leq \sum_{k=1}^j \mu_k$